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1. Introduction 
Vertical relationships between producers and retailers or wholesalers often 
involve more or less complex contracting arrangements, broadly named 
vertical restraints. These arrangements can simply consist in non-linear 
tariffs, such as franchise fees, quantity forcing or pricing requirements 
(quotas, Resale Price Maintenance), but they may also include the assign- 
ment of exclusive territories or exclusive dealing, tie ins, etc.’ This paper is 
concerned with investigating the rationale for these restrictions and showing 
that there are important circumstances under which these restrictions have 
a significant anti-competitive effect, at the upper level as well as at the lower 
one. 
The legal status of these restraints is not very clear, as it differs among 
countries and changes over times. * From the economic point of view, two 
main streams of ideas have emerged from the beginning: on one side, some 
produce the argument that, as markets are competitive and as these 
arrangements can be adopted only if joint profits are increased, there must 
necessarily be a gain in efficiency; on the other side, some emphasize the anti- 
competitive effects of these restraints at the lower (retailers’ or wholesalers’) 
level. 
Recently, some efforts have been done in order to formalize the efficiency 
argument [see for example Mathewson and Winter (1983), (1984)J. The 
vertical relationship is viewed as a principal-agent(s) one, and the emphasis 
‘See Blair and Kaserman (1983) and Caves (1984) for a general presentation of vertical 
restraints, as well as a comprehensive discussion of their economic incidence. 
ZFor instance, RPM is generally considered as illegal; however, some States in the U.S. had 
for a while adopted ‘fair trade’ laws, which partially author&d RPM. Thus, even looking only 
to the case of the U.S., RPM, which was originally viewed as per se violation of the Sherman 
Act, has then been accepted in some States, till 1975; it is now again illegal in all States. In the 
same way, assigning exclusive territories, after having &en considered as per se illegal, is now 
subject to a rule of reason. 
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is placed on control problems: a monopolistic producer deals with a set of 
more or less competitioe retailers, whose actions (retail prices, selling efforts, 
etc.) affect the total profits; the problem for the producer is thus to design a 
contract in order to achieve the integrated solution, i.e., to make the retailers 
choose the right actions and to recover back the generated profits. The main 
conclusion in this framework is that vertical restraints are always privately 
desirable, as they allow a better control of the retailers.’ Moreover, as they 
help in correcting externalities associated with linear pricing rules, such as 
the double marginalization problem [Spengler (1950)] or the free-rider 
problem [Telser (1960)], these vertical restraints are usually thought of as 
increasing social welfare. 
This apologetical view has already been shaded by recent works, which 
emphasize for instance the divergence between the monopolist’s and the 
consumers’ valuations for distributors’ services [see Scherer (1983). Comanor 
(1985) and Caillaud and Rey (1987)J or the role of distributors’ private 
information in uncertain markets [see Rey and Tirole (1986b)]. The general 
framework is however the same, and in particular inter-brand competition 
(i.e., competition among producers) is neglected. 
We will argue here that producers’ competition is in fact a crucial element 
for the analysis of vertical arrangements. As we will show, when several 
producers are imperfectly competing at the upper level, then vertical 
restraints may serve to facilitate collusion. The contractual arrangement may 
indeed be efficient, in the sense that joint profits are higher, but the gains to 
the producers and distributors are at the expense of consumers. Vertical 
restraints may not thus be socially desirable. 
We aim to emphasize the interaction between the internal (producer/ 
retailer) contract designing and the external competitive situation at the 
upper level. The natural framework is provided by the multiprincipal-multi- 
agents approach which, developed by Fershtman and Judd (1984,1986), has 
recently been analysed by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), in the case of 
common agency, and by Katz (1987), in the case of rivalrous agencies. This 
approach stresses in particular the role of internal principal/agents contracts 
as a commitment for sustaining collusion among principals; it also emphasizes 
the importance of the definition of admissible contracts and the role of each 
agent’s information. This approach has already yielded new insights in the 
analysis of imperfect competition [see respectively Bernheim and Whinston 
(1985) and Bonanno and Vickers (1987) for applications in contexts of 
common and rivalrous agencies). As we will see, it also constitutes a useful 
tool for the analysis of the rationale and the incidence of vertical restraints. 
3For an introduction to this literature on vertical control, see Rey and Tirolc (l986a). Indeed, 
one of the objectives of this literature is to define the ‘minimal sets of sufkient tools’, which lead 
to a perfect control of the distributors by the producer. {Exclusive territories plus franchise fees} 
generally constitutes an example of such a minimal set: it amounts in fact to ‘sell the firm’ (or. 
more exactly, the production technology) to distributors. 
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2. Exclusive territories as a device to reduce competition 
We consider here a simple model, borrowed from Rey and Stiglitz (1985), 
which shows how exclusive territories, which obviously reduce competition at 
the lower level, may actually be a way of reducing competition at the upper 
level as well. The basic idea is that when retailers enjoy some kind of 
monopolistic power, they may put higher mark-ups in the retail price: this 
price distortion, in turn, induces some change on the cross sensitivity of this 
demand towards the prices of the manufacturer’s competitors. The manufac- 
turers may therefore perceive a less elastic demand than when they directly 
compete with each other or address to competitive retailers. This effect in 
turn may induce both producers to assign exclusive territories to their 
retailers. 
Let us describe this model. There are two manufacturers, each producing a 
simple good with a constant marginal cost ci and distributing it via retailers 
who have no retail costs. The two products are imperfect substitutes. The 
final demand for good i, associated to retail prices q, and q2, is given by 
D,Jq,q,). For simplicity, we assume symmetry: c, =c2 and Vx,y~ R+, D,(x,y)= 
D,(y,x). Consumers have no search cost and thus buy from the lowest 
possible price for each product. Lastly, we will suppose in the following that 
all profit functions are concave admit a unique - and interior - maximum, 
and we will thus focus on first-order conditions. 
We can define two useful benchmarks, corresponding respectively to 
perfect collusion and direct competition between producers: 
- the collusive outcome is defined by the maximization of the aggregate 
profits (4, --PAq19q2)+h2- c)D,(q,,q,), and leads to the monopolistic 
price q” 
( 4” - d/q” = l/h(qrn, qrn) + dqrn, 4”h (1) 
where c, and .s2 respectively denote the direct and cross price elasticities of 
the final demands (Ei= -3 log 0,/J log qi). The monopolistic mark-up is thus 
the higher, the lower is the sensitivity of the demand for a product with 
respect to its own price and the higher is the sensitivity of this demand to the 
price of the other product.4 
- the outcome associated to direct competition corresponds to the (Nash) 
equilibrium of the game defined by producer I’s strategy qi and payoff 
(q, -c)Di(q,. q2). The ‘competitive’ price Q is characterized by (under standard 
assumptions on payoffs functions) 
(4’-cc)/@= Ve1(9,qC). (2) 
Of course the ‘competitive’ profits are lower. When the two products are 
4As the two goods are substitutes, one has e2s0. 
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substitutes, retail prices also are lower; the basic idea is that each producer, 
when he chooses his own price, does not take into account the fact that his 
rival’s demand gains from an increase in his own price. Note that indeed, it 
would be in the interest of the producers to convince each other that they 
would follow up any price increase. 
Let us now make precise the competitive framework. It is supposed that 
producers observe the quantity bought by the retailers and possibly whether 
or not the retailers distribute their products; they do not observe neither the 
quantities sold by the retailers nor their profits or the prices they charge. On 
the contrary, retailers have perfect information and observe the contracts 
signed by each producer; in particular, they can do arbitrage if a producer 
tries to discriminate between them. Finally, producers may assign exclusive 
territories to their retailers (in which case these territories are supposed to be 
symmetric and thus representative of the total market).5 Given these 
informational assumptions, the admissible contracts between a producer and 
his retailers can only include, besides the assignment of exclusive territories, 
wholesale tariffs based on the quantity bought by the retailers. The 
possibility of arbitrage from the retailers rules out non constant marginal 
prices; producers may however impose franchise fees on the retailers if they 
effectively observe who sell their products. We will consider both situatipns. 
We formalize the competition framework as a two-stage game: in the first 
stage, given some vertical contracting arrangement, producers simultaneously 
choose their wholesale prices, pi and p2 (and eventually the franchise fees); 
then in the second stage, retailers observe all wholesale tariffs and simul- 
taneously choose their retail prices. We will consider in the following the 
(subgame) perfect equilibria of this two-stage game, corresponding to two 
initial situations: in the first one, retailers are pure price competitors whereas 
in the second one, exclusive territories have been assigned to the retailers. 
(i) In absence of vertical arrangement, pure (intra-brand) price competition 
leads the retailers to charge zero mark-ups in the second stage, and thus the 
retail prices are finally equal to the wholesale prices chosen in the first stage: 
qi=pi (this in turn implies that franchise fees, even if they are available, must 
be equal to zero). The situation is therefore formally identical to the situation 
of ‘direct’ competition between producers, that we already characterized. At 
the end of this subgame, the wholesale and retail prices are equal to the 
‘competitive’ price qc, retail profits are zero and producers get the 
‘competitive’ profits. 
‘The following assumptions are more precisely presented and discussed in Rey and Stiglitz 
(1985). The two main assumptions are the asymmetry in information between retailers and 
producers about retail prices and sales, and the fact that all contracts are common knowledge. 
The first assumption may be justilied in several ways, including moral hazard aspects on the 
retail side [see Rey and Tirole (1986b)]. The assumption that the retailers observe all producers’ 
contracts allows producers, as we will see. to use these contracts in order to achieve better 
profits: they are therefore strongly interested in making them common knowledge. 
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(ii) Let us now suppose that producers have assigned exclusive territories 
to their retailers. These arrangements eliminate intra-brand competition and 
thus each retailer enjoys a monopolistic power over some fixed fraction of 
the final demand for his product. Given the producers’ prices p1 and p2. at 
the second stage some retail price equilibrium will emerge, described by 
(4;(plp&,(Ir2(plpZ)): each retail price is a function of the two producers* 
prices; note that franchise fees, which should be viewed as fixed costs, can 
alter the retailers’ decisions about distributing or not a product, but do not 
change the price response functions. For simplicity, we will again assume 
symmetry: Vx, Y E f4 +, 4;(x, y) = &(Y, -4. 
(a) Suppose first that franchise fees are not available. At the first stage 
producer i chooses a price pi to maximize 
ni=(Pi-c)DX~~(Pl~ P2)r @Z(Pl* P2))r (3) 
which leads to wholesale and retail prices which satisfy p1 =p2 =p’, q, =q2 = 
q’= qXp’, p’), and 
(P’--)/Pe= l/C=me?q’)P,(PP* P’) +&2w> 4%2(P’* P’)l, 
where p1 and pt respectively denote the elasticities of a given retailer’s price 
to his producer’s (for p,) and the rival’s (for p2) wholesale prices (Pi=dlogq;/ 
d log pi). 
(b) Suppose now that producers can require franchise fees. Anticipating the 
retail price equilibrium (which, as already noticed, is not modified when 
introducing franchise fees), the producer can recover via the franchise fees the 
associated retail profits. Thus producer i’s profits are given by 
(5) 
The equilibrium condition becomes 
(6) 
Let us briefly comment on this analysis. If, as one might normally expect, 
competitive pressures result in p, being positive but less than one, and p2 
being positive but less than P,,~ then one obtains 
6Retailers that find that their wholesale prices have increased while their competitors have not 
do not simply pass on the cost increase with the usual mark-up. but rather absorb some of the 
cost increase themselves (i.e., Osp, s 1). This in turn induces the competitors to increase their 
own retail prices (p2 20); it seems however reasonable to suppose that the direct etTect, measured 
by p,, is higher than the indirect one: p*sp,. 
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Thus, when exclusive territories are assigned, and whether or not franchise 
fees are required, the equilibrium retail prices are higher. 
In the case where franchise fees are not allowed, wholesale prices also are 
higher when exclusive territories are assigned. This only comes from a 
change in the elasticity of the perceived demand; this change results from two 
effects: first, the reduction of demand is altered by the fact that the retail 
price of a product only partially responds to the corresponding wholesale 
price; secondly, the loss of sales is also decreased because the rival’s retailers, 
who then face higher retail prices, find it optimal to increase their own prices. 
This change of the sensitivity of the demand leads to higher wholesale price 
response functions and, thus, to higher wholesale price at the equilibrium. If 
double marginalization problems are not too important, then producer’s 
profits also are higher when exclusive territories are assigned to retailers. 
In the case where franchise fees are allowed, then the above analysis shows 
that under reasonable assumptions, producers’ profits are higher when 
exclusive territories are assigned. This does not only come from a decrease of 
the elasticity of the perceived demand (note in particular that wholesale 
prices need not be higher), but also from the fact that, by assigning exclusive 
territories to their retailers, producers generate higher retaif prices.’ 
3. Comments 
In the model just analysed, the producers are presumably better off when 
exclusive territories are assigned to the distributors. It does not a priori 
imply that producers will indeed assign exclusive territories to their retailers 
(unless they can cooperatively agree to do so). A possible way for analysing 
the producers’ choices of vertical arrangements consists in introducing a new 
stage at the beginning of the game, where each producer chooses between 
competition and exclusive territories for his retailers. Rey and Stiglitz (1985) 
provides an example where assigning exclusive territories and requiring 
franchise fees is actually a dominant strategy for each producer, although the 
corresponding outcome is Pareto dominated by the outcome associated to 
the situation where both producers commit themselves to assign exclusive 
territories and to require no franchise fees (there is thus a standard 
‘prisoners’ dilemma’). This example highlights the potentiai role of vertical 
restraints for decreasing producers’ competition and also emphasizes the 
‘Similar effects are present in the context analysed by Bonanno and Vickers (1987). Two 
situations are there compared: the first one corresponds to what we called ‘direct competition’ 
between producers: in the second one. each producer delegates to a single agent the distribution 
of his good. Formally, the first situation is similar to the situation where each product is 
distributed via perfectly competitive retailers, while the second situation (delegation) corresponds 
to exclusive territories in our framework. 
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divergence between collective and individual rationalities: two phenomena 
which were ignored in most of the previous analyses of vertical restraints.’ 
Indeed in this analysis, retailers can be considered as ‘black boxes’ or 
‘response machines’; by modifying the vertical arrangements proposed to his 
retailers, a producer simply commits himself to respond in a given way to 
any change of his rivals’ attitudes. Of course if all possible ‘response 
machines’ were available, complete collusion would then be achievable [see 
Katz (1987)]; the question therefore is to define the admissible ‘black boxes’. 
In this respect, vertical restraints can be viewed as a natural tool for 
constructing more efficient response machines, i.e., response machines which 
enable the producers to decrease competition at their level. For instance, in 
the previous model, producers could modify the design of territories in order 
to decrease as much as possible the elasticity of the perceived demand; or 
they could give the right to sell their products to the same retailers (common 
agency), or distribute their product via wholesalers, who in turn could assign 
exclusive territories to retailers, etc. In other contexts, depending on 
observability and enforceability conditions, different vertical restraints might 
also be introduced to extend the set of available ‘response machines’. 
This analysis sheds new lights on the economic effect of the use of vertical 
restraints on markets performance and social welfare. Till now, two extreme 
situations were mainly considered: the first one refers to perfectly competitive 
markets, where only efficiency arguments can explain the use of these 
restraints; the second situation corresponds to the case of a monopolistic 
producer and, although private and social interests may conflict, at least 
from the private point of view efficiency arguments may still, to some extent, 
be relevant. But if one considers a situation where there is imperfect 
competition at the upper level (which is generally true in most famous cases 
involving the use of vertical restraints), then a new motivation appears: 
vertical restraints may be used only to decrease competition between 
producers; this has usually a negative impact on the social welfare, the gain 
in additional profits being overwhelmed by the loss of consumers’ surplus. Of 
course the above analysis is very partial; it however suggests a new approach 
for the economic theory of vertical restraints. 
sTelser (1960) and Posner (1977) suggested that RPM could help producers in sustaining 
collusion by reducing the interest of wholesale price cuts. It has also been suggested that 
exclusivity requirements (such as exclusive dealing) can serve to deter entry, as they compel the 
potential entrants to set up their own distribution networks. 
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